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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DAIRY D~STRIBUTORS, INC.,
a corpora bon,
Pl azn
. t z.If.,
vs.
DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE
COUNTY AND HONORABLE
LEWIS JONES, Judge thereof,
and LOCAL UNION 976, a labor
D ef end an t s.
organization,

I
I

No.

9847

PETITION FOR A REHEARING AND BRIEF
IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Come now the defendants in the above entitled
proceeding and move the court to grant a rehearing in
this cause upon the following grounds:
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING
JURISDICTION OF A SUIT IN EQUITY
ORIGINALLY ENTITLED IN THIS COURT

1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

AS LOCAL UNION 976, A LABOR ORGANIZATION, PLAINTIFF, VS. DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, INC., A CORPORATION, DEFENDANT, AND IN DISPOSING OF THE
SAME UNDER THE ABOVE ENTITLED
CAUSE.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
COMPLY WITH THAT PROVISION OF
RULE 76 (a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE WHEREIN IT IS DIRECTED THAT "EVERY DECISION OF THE
COURT (SUPRE~iE COURT ON REHEARING) TOGETIIER WITH THE REASONS
THEREFOR, CONSISELY STATED, SHALL
BE IN WRITING AND FILED WITH THE
CLERK."
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
DETERMINE WHETHER DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS AT THE TIME COMPLAINED OF
WAS OR WAS NOT A CONTRACT CARRIER.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED BY, IN EFFECT,
DECIDING TIIAT DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS,
2
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AT THE TIME COMPLAINED OF, HAD A
PER~IIT

TO ENGAGE IN INTERSTATE
COl\I~IERCE, NOTWITHSTANDING ALL
THE EVIDENCE, PI.-~US THE ADMISSION
OF COUNSEL FOR DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS,
CLEARLY SHOWS THAT IT DID NOT
HAYE ANY PERMIT, CONTRACT, COMJION, PRIVATE OR OTHERWISE.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING
THAT PURSUANT TO THE ALLEGATIONS
SET OUT IN THE COMPLAINT FILED IN
THE DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY THAT ANY AMENDMENTS THERETO
OR ANY E'TIDENCE THAT MAY BE SUBMITTED WOULD BE OF NO ASSISTANCE
TO LOCAL UNION 976 IN ITS PURSUIT OF
RELIEF.
We, the undersigned attorneys for the parties
above named defendants, hereby certify that in our
opinion there is merit to this petition for a rehearing
and the same is not filed for the purpose of delay.

OMER J. CALL
ELIAS HANSEN
CALVIN L. RAMPTON
CLARENCE BECK
Attorneys for above named
Defendants
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ARGUMENT
We are mindful that the courts do not look with
favor of petitions for rehearing. However, if counsel
believe in their opinion that material error has been
committed, it would seem to be their duty to the court
and the interest of parties to prevail upon the court to
correct such errors. In this case counsel for Local Union
976 feel obligated to exhaust all available legal means
to secure a decision from a court of last resort putting
at rest the question of whether or not a party may
lawfully engage in the business in which Dairy Distributors was engaged at the time complained of. This
proceeding is of major importance and consequence not
only to the labor organizations directly involved but
to all common and contract carriers engaged in interstate commerce. The amount of unauthorized transportation in interstate commerce has been variously
estimated at from 4.57o to about 507o of all interstate
commerce. Bureau of Transportation Economics and
Statistics Statement No. 6010, Gray Area of Transportation Operations, Page 13 ( 1960), Traffic 'Vorld,
Volume 107, No. 9, Page 29 (~larch 4, 1961). The
interests of the regulated carriers in interstate commerce by motor vehicles was made evident by the appearance of Grant, Shafroth, Toll and McHendrie and
John F. Muller, Denver attorneys, as amici curiae in
the case of Dairy Distributors, Inc., appellants, vs.
Western Conference of Teamsters in the Federal lOth
Circuit Court of Appeals, 294 Fed. 2nd 348, referred
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to in the pleadings filed in the District Court of Cache
County.
By way of illustration we quote from former Governor and Senator of Colorado Edwin C. Johnson,
long time Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and presently a director
of the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad,
wherein he testified before the Senate Committee on
February 7, 1962, re S.2560 to wit:
"To borrow from Herodotus 'neither snow,
nor rain, nor heat, nor gloom of night would stay
the Common Carrier from the swift completion
of his appointed rounds, in serving the public
with whatever transportation it required, when
it required it.' A certificate to operate as a regula ted Common Carrier was not a license to do
what the carrier pleased. To the contrary the
unregulated carrier may go where he pleases,
when he pleases and how he pleases, provided his
load is either agricultural exempt commodities
or his own property. But these fellows needed
back hauls to n1ake their trips pay and they began looking for loop holes in the law and they
found them. They discovered some slick ways to
beat the law too, and they began digging pretty
deep into common carrier traffic for their back
hauls.
"As this Cornmittee knows, some of the unregulated carriers purchased a truck or two on
a small down payment and had to earn a dollar
wherever and however they could to meet the
future payments. While some well financed
businesses do transport their own property of
course, but they too need a back haul and they do
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try to obtain one. Much of the time it requires
a bit of finagling to do this. There are all sorts
of variations in lining up back hauls for the unregulated-some legal and some illegal. It is
estimated that unregulated trucks do two-thirds
of the trucking business and that nearly 20%
of it is illegal. The Undersecretary of Commerce
is quoted as saying, 'That portion of the Interstate Commerce Act pertaining to motor carriers
is probably the most violated statute in the
land.'
"Private and exempt carriers cannot compete
with the common carriers without a back haul.
They cannot mooch traffic for that back haul
from the common carriers legally, yet they do
mooch it. In some instances trip leasing is the
modus operandi, or the guy-and-sell gyp, the
Phony Co-op, the shady broker, and many other
fraudulent devices. Loop holes must be closed
and law breakers punished. Lax, weak, ambiguous and ill considered provisions of our laws has
invited invasion by the unregulated carriers.
Loop holes have been discovered and successfully
used by them. Chislers have moved in also. Boldness in some cases has ripened into wholesale
disregard for the intent of the law.
"Due to widespread destructive competition it
now appears that interstate trucking is reverting
to the chaos and confusion that prevailed prior
to August 9th, 1935. And due to their heavy
capital investment in idle equipment, road beds
and tracks, the railroads are suffering greater
losses than the motor common carriers in some
parts of our country, from this unfair and destructive cmnpetition. 'Vith commendable patience the common carriers have tried hard and
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have practiced co-existence with the unregulated
but it will not work . . . "
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING
JURISDICTION OF A SUIT IN EQUITY
ORIGINALLY ENTITLED IN THIS COURT
AS LOCAL UNION 976, A LABOR ORGANIZATION, PLAINTIFF, VS. DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, INC., A CORPORATION, DEFENDANT, AND IN DISPOSING OF THE
SAME UNDER THE ABOVE ENTITLED
CAUSE.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure contains among
its provisions, Rule I:
" . . . these rules shall govern the procedure
in the Supreme Court, the district courts, city
courts, and justice courts of the State of Utah
in all actions, suits and proceedings of a civil
nature whether cognizable in law or in equity

"
Rule 10 (a):
"Every pleading shall contain a caption, setting forth the name of the court, the title of the
action, the file number, and a designation as in
Rule 7 (a) . In the Complaint, the title of the
action shall include the names of all the parties
but in other pleadings it is sufficient to state the
name of the first party on each side with an
appropriate indication of other parties."
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In this case, the pleadings by which Dairy Distributors sought to vest this court with jurisdiction
placed Local Union 976, a labor organization as plaintiff and Dairy Distributors, Inc., a corporation, as
defendant. In the decision rendered, Dairy Distributors
was made plaintiff while Local Union 976 was made
a defendant and the District Court and Honorable
Lewis Jones were added as parties in the title as additional defendants. Apparently the change was made by
the court without any motion or other pleading requesting such change. 1\..s was pointed out in the briefs filed
at the time of hearings herein in this court, it is generally
held that a proceeding for a writ of prohibition is an
independent proceeding and in no sense an appeal from
a decision of a lower court. The initial means of vesting
this court with jurisdiction of the parties when an
action is brought to prohibit further proceedings is by
making the court and parties in interest defendants in
the action. The rules above cited so provide. The authorities heretofore cited, particularly the case if in re Evans
et al., 42 Utah 285, 130 Pac. 217, teach that the means
of giving a court jurisdiction of an action is by a proper
pleading.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING
COMPLY WITH T HAT PROVISION
RULE 76 (a) OF THE UTAH RULES
CI"VIL PROCEDlTRE 'VHEREIN IT IS

TO
OF
OF
DI-

8

\
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RECTED THAT "E\rERY DECISION OF THE
COURT (SUPRE~IE COURT ON REHEARING) TOGETHER WITH THE REASONS
TH:E.REFOR, CONSISEL Y STATED, SHALIJ
BE IN WitiTING AND FILED WITH THE
CLERK."
The only grounds urged by Dairy Distributors in
the argument recently had in this cause before this court
was that the doctrine of res judicata precludes Local
Union 976 being heard in the District Court of Cache
County in its equity suit to enjoin the enforcement of
the judgment rendered against it in favor of Dairy
Distributors. In its Complaint filed in the District Court
in Cache County all of the facts in the proceedings
which were deemed necessary prior to the bringing of
such equitable suit were alleged. In the argument of
counsel for Dairy Distributors they therein apparently
relied solely upon the doctrine of res judicata and
stressed the fact that there had already been a number
of proceedings attacking the validity of the judgment
and that there should be an end to litigation. The atten- ,
tion of the court is called to the law which teaches that '
before relief may be had in equity, the one so seeking
relief must first exhaust his legal remedies. Such doctrine is applied in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a
judgment. See 49 C.J.S., Sec. 343, Page 695. It will
be seen that numerous cases are cited in footnotes to
the text above mentioned. We have examined a number
of the cases there cited, all of which support the text.
Of course, the members of this court will not have the

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

time to read all of the cases, but the case of Lind vs.
Moyer, 20 Pac. 2nd 794, 52 Idaho 986, shows the trend
of judicial authority. Thus if Local 976 not not participated in the appeal to this court and the effort to
secure a review of the decision by the Supreme Court
of the United States, it would be confronted with the
doctrine that it had not exhausted all of its legal remedies before it brought its suit in equity to enjoin enforcement of the judgment against it.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
DETERMINE 'VIIETHER DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS AT THE Til\'lE COMPLAINED OF
WAS OR WAS NOT A CONTRACT CARRIER.
In neither of the proceedings had in this court on
the original appeal or in its opinion in this court has
the court decided whether or not Dairy Distributors at
the time complained of was or was not a contract carrier,
and as such declared to have a permit from the Interstate Commerce Commission before it could lawfully
engage in transporting goods in interstate commerce.
Nor was such a determination had in the trial of this
cause in the Third District Court of Utah, nor in the
decision rendered by the United States lOth Circuit
Court of Appeals, 294 Fed. 2nd 348. That Dairy Distributors was engaged in interstate commerce was decided by the United States District Court and such find-
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ing of the Federal District Court has never been reversed, disturbed or challenged by any court. As we
have heretofore pointed out in the briefs heretofore
filed herein, the Complaint filed by Dairy Distributors
in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County discloses and the case authorities affirmatively show that
Dairy Distributors was a contract carrier at the time
complained of. From our investigation of the authorities, all agreed that it is of controlling importance in
actions such as that which resulted in the judgment
against Local 976 to ascertain whether Dairy Distributors was or was not a contract carrier at the time complained of. The Utah Supreme Court in its decisions
in the cases of Olsen vs. Reese, 200 Pac. 2nd 733, and
Eklund vs. Elwell, 211 Pac. 2nd 849, commit the court
to the doctrine that one engaged in a business requiring
a permit to engage in a business must allege and prove
that he had such a permit before he can recover damages
to such business.

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED BY, IN EFFECT,
DECIDING THAT DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS,
AT THE TIME COMPLAINED OF, HAD A
PERMIT TO ENGAGE IN INTERSTATE
CO~IMERCE, NOTWITHSTANDING ALL
THE EVIDENCE, PI.JUS THE ADMISSION
OF COUNSEL FOR DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS,
CLEARLY SI-IOWS THAT IT DID NOT
11
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HAVE ANY PERMIT, CONTRACT, COlVIMON, PRIVATE OR OTHERWISE.
The case decided by this court upon the appeal
from the judgment rendered in Third District Court
of Salt Lake County against Local Union 976 and
others was fundamentally an entirely different case
from that shown by the evidence and the admission of
counsel for Dairy Distributors to be the facts. If Dairy
Distributors, at the time complained of, had a permit
to engage in the business in which it was engaged, it is
obvious that no one could be heard to complain of its
operation on the ground that it did not have a permit.
On the other hand if Dairy Distributors was, at the
time complained of, engaged in transporting goods in
interstate commerce as a contract carrier without having the required permit from the Interstate Commerce
Commission, it would seem equally obvious that such
business was illegal. So far as the records and the
various proceedings had in which Local Union 976 w:as
a party, including the decision of this court on appeal,
the judgment against it could not have been rendered
or sustained if the fact that Dairy Distributors did not
have a license had been noted and considered. If it
should be said that the court might have decided the
case against Local Union 976 on some other ground,
the answer is that such a speculation does not aid the
claim that the doctrine of res judicata precludes a
direct attack on such a judgment. It would seem that
the purpose of adopting the Rules of Civil Procedure
heretofore mentioned was to enable the parties litigant
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to know just what had been decided. Independent of
such rules, the law seems settled that before a judgment
may be said to be res judicata, the law and the facts
must be the same in both cases. We again direct the
attention of the court to the law announced in 50 C.J.S.,
Sec. 719, Page 198 et seq., and such cases as Paine and
"rilliams Company vs. Baldwin Rubber Company, 113
Fed. 2nd 840, and Hamilton vs. Comb, 75 Pac. 2nd 39.
IVIay it be said that a case in which a contract carrier
has a permit to engage in interstate commerce that the
law and the facts are the same as in a case where a
contract carrier does not have such a permit? May a
court, by accident or mistake or otherwise, deprive a
party to a litigation of his defense by making or approving a finding of controlling importance contrary
to all the evidence and the admission of the party in
whose favor a judgment is rendered? We submit that
is the duty and responsibility of a court in equity, that
is what it is for and that it shall and will grant relief
from such a judgment, as we understand the law announced by the courts generally and by this court in
such cases as Bank vs. Goss, 300 Pac. 277; Benson vs.
Anderson, 11 Utah 135; and Taylor vs. Guaranty
Mortgage Company, 62 Utah 520, 220 Pac. 1067; see
also 49 C.J.S. 707-708 and cases cited in footnotes to
the text.
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POINT V
THE COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING
THAT PURSUANT TO THE ALLEGATIONS
SET OUT IN THE COMPLAINT FILED IN
THE DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY THAT ANY AMENDMENTS THERETO
OR ANY EVIDENCE THAT MAY BE SUBMITTED WOULD BE OF NO ASSISTANCE
TO LOCAL UNION 976 IN ITS PURSUIT OF
RELIEF.
As will be noted from the authorities cited, the
doctrine of res judicata is not a rule of law but a policy
in the nature of an estoppel; it is not encouraged by
the courts. That is to say, the doctrine of res judicata
is yieldable and flexible and so intended to be. It is not
a Procrustesan rule of the Medes and Persians. It
presupposes a day in court and a fair trial by a court
of competent jurisdiction.
If a complaint is found wanting it
" ... may be amended as a matter of course
at any time before a responsive pleading is
served or, if the pleading is one in which no
responsive pleading is permitted and the action
has not been placed on the trial calendar, he may
so amend at any time within twenty days after
it is served." Rule 15 (a).
So also:
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent by the par-
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ties they shall be treated in all respects as if they
had been raised in the pleadings." Rule 15 (b).
If we are wrong in assuming that the decisions
rendered in this case are based solely upon the doctrine
of res judicata, we direct the attention of the court to
what we conceive to be the law applicable to some other
facts alleged in the Complaint filed in the District Court
of Cache County. Doubtless it will be agreed that Local
976 is not bound by decisions rendered in the United
States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals because it was
not a party to that suit or in privity with the Western
Conference of Teamsters. However, during the course
of this argument, the Chief Justice remembered that
it was some time since the judgment was rendered
against Local 976. It cannot successfully be claimed
that Dairy Distributors was prejudiced by any delay
in bringing this action. There was no occasion to have
two actions pending against Dairy Distributors at the
same time. Moreover, if the case brought in the District
Court of Cache County had been permitted to be heard,
the Local Union 976 would have had a good reason
for the delay or at least this court may not asssume the
contrary.
In commenting on the permit or license issue in
the opinion of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, it is stated, "from the record before us and the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Utah, we cannot clearly determine whether the Utah Court considered and
acted upon that issue." The Chief Justice remembered
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that this court is not bound by that statement, to which
counsel for Local 976 agreed, but even so, such statement of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
is some evidence that the opinion of this court is so
uncertain that the doctrine of res judicata does not preclude Local Uno in 976 from maintaining the present
action. At the oral argument, counsel for Dairy Distributors urged the fact that the Supreme Court of the
United States had denied application for a writ of
certiorari which precluded Local 976 from maintaining
an action to enjoin the judgment here involved. It is
generally known that the Supreme Court of the United
States of necessity will hear only those cases in which
questions of public importance are involved and in
which the circuit courts of appeals or state courts of last
resort are in conflict as to questions of law. In this case,
the opinions of the United States Court of Appeals and
this court do not appear to be in conflict as to the law.
Had this court decided that Dairy Distributors was a
contract carrier, as the record manifestly shows, but
did not need a permit from the Interstate Commerce
Commission before it could lawfully engage in interstate commerce, it is reasonable to assume that the
Supreme Court of the lJnited States would not have
denied certiorari. In this connection, it may be observed
that as stated in the case of Norris vs. Alabama, 294
U.S. 587, 55 Supreme Court SCT 597, 79 Law Ed
1094, that the evidence in a case is examined only when
it becomes necessary to do so to determine whether a
federal right has been denied. Thus, if this court had,
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in its opinion, made a finding in conformity with the
evidence and admission of the counsel for Dairy Distributors that Dairy Distributors did not, at the time
complained of, have a permit from Interstate Commerce Commission to engage in interstate commerce, it
is reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court of the
United States would have taken jurisdiction and set at
rest the question which divides the parties to this controversy. Nor is there any basis for a finding that Local
976 or its agents or attorneys were guilty of any negligence that would preclude Local 976 from prosecuting
the action pending in the District Court of Cache
County. If that proceeding had been heard, the evidence
would have shown that counsel for Local Union 976
was informed that Dairy Distributors had the necessary
permits to engage in the commerce that it was conducting at the time complained of. It was not until the
examination of Mr. Gassner, the president and manager
of Dairy Distributors, that it become known that Dairy
Distributors did not have the required permit.
In this connection we invite the court's attention
to this aspect. The plaintiff's complaint in the Salt Lake
County District Court makes no mention of a federal
statute, hence that court's jurisdiction would have been
obviously pre-empted unless such action would fall
under the provisions of Sec. 301 and 303 of the federal
Labor Management Relations Act 1947, which provisions drastically limit the state court's jurisdiction in
such behalf. Among the indispensible requisites to the
state court's jurisdiction is that plaintiff's transportation
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business must involve interstate commerce. Manifestly
therefore plaintiff may not invoke one federal act regulating interstate commerce while in criminal violation
of another act regulating interstate commerce and
recover legally damages to an illegal business. However,
if it does so recover, then in such event a court of equity
would be obligated to examine the matter to determine
whether the limits of the court's power and authority
had been exceeded or fundamental rights denied.
A state court of general jurisdiction deriving its
power and authority from state law presents a different
situation than where a state court derives its power and
authority exclusively from a federal statute limiting
the authority and jurisdiction of such state court and
more expressly where the issues involved are virtually
IOOlfo federal questions of law.
"A court exercising equitable powers can enjoin persons from taking advantage of a judgment of any court of the state even though it is
a court to which it is subordinate. Thus, a court
of equity whose judgments are subject to be
overruled by the supreme court of the state, can
properly enjoin a party from utilizing a judgment which was improperly obtained, although
the judgment was affirmed by the Supreme
Court." Judgments-Restatement, Para. 114,
Page 551.
Moreover, if Judge Jones had been permitted to
continue within the scope of his equity jurisdiction and
had found as a matter of fact that Dairy Distributors,
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Inc., was operating an illegal business for the loss of
which no recovery rna y be had-res judicata would be
patently inapplicable if that was the fact, notwithstanding this doctrine was relied upon by Dairy Distributors,
Inc., to support its interim quest for a writ of prohibition to interrupt such proceeding. It is familiar
doctrine that equity may always be invoked to obtain
judicial review to protect an assert~d essential right.
See opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in the case of
Shields vs. Utah Idaho Central Railroad Company, 80
L. Ed. 111, 305 U.S. 177, and cases cited.
Probably no useful purpose will be served by extending this brief. vVe have already repeated some
matters that are covered by the briefs heretofore filed
in the proceedings had before this court. The facts were
gone into at considerable length in the briefs filed when
the case was before this court on appeal. If the court
should so desire, doubtless the facts, together with the
law, which we contend are aplicable to such facts, are
available in the records which have been filed in this
court. In conclusion Local Union 976 urges that this
court re-examine the facts and the law applicable to
this case to the end that the decisions heretofore rendered
be vacated and the relief sought by Dairy Distributors
be denied, or if that is not done, that the court grant
the relief prayed for in the case brought in the District
Court of Cache County to the end that if Dairy Distributors are entitled to any relief as a result of acts
complained of, that such relief be granted only after
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trial is had which is free from the errors which, we submit, render the judgment heretofore entered unenforceable.
All of which is respectfully submitted.

OMERJ.CALL
ELIAS HANSEN
CALVIN L. RAMPTON
CLARENCE BECK
Attorneys for above named
Defendants
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